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
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THESIS

THE PRIOR SERVICE ACCESSIONS POOL:
WHO ARE THEY AND HOW DO WE RECRUIT THEM?

by

LeVerne Perry Fernandez

December 1982

Thesis Advisor:

G. W. Thomas

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The Prior Service Accessions Pool: Who Are They
and How Do We Recruit Them?

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., The Citadel, 1977

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 1982

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the feasibility of using prior service personnel as a source for fulfilling manpower requirements in the military. This study focused on a male population between the ages of 19 and 35 who were either discharged from a service or reenlisted after broken service between 1 July 1975 and 30 September 1981. The size and quality of the available pool was established. The use of prior service accessions from 1975 to 1981 was analyzed. The study concludes with recommendations for research and changes in current prior service recruiting and utilization policies. Research to be conducted primarily in the area of skill degradation to investigate the validity of paygrade reductions based on the length of broken service. Policy changes would reflect the research findings, aggressively recruit prior service personnel and make the return to active duty an easier transition than it is today.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

Since the advent of the all-volunteer force in 1973, military recruiters have been relatively successful in attracting sufficient volunteers to maintain authorized force levels. Table 1 provides a summary of non-prior service accessions into the all-volunteer force for fiscal years 1975 through 1981 (Hunter and Nelson, 1979, p. 3).

Table 1							
All-Volunteer Force Summary Data FY1975 - FY1981							
	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
<u>Strength</u>							
Authorized Strength (000)	2127	2091	2093	2085	2056	2052	2080
Actual Strength (000)	2149	2081	2074	2061	2027	2050	2082
% Achieved	99.0	99.+	99.+	98.9	98.6	99.+	100.
<u>Accessions</u>							
Total (000)	458	422	411	332	338	390	367
% of Objectives	102		98	98	93	101	101
NPS							
Accessions (000)	419	397	388	312	316	360	328
HSG (000)	277	273	269	240	229	244	265
HSG % of NPS							
Accessions	66	69	69	77	73	68	81
<u>Reenlistment Rates</u>							
First Term	37	30	35	37	37	39	43
Career	82	76	75	72	68	71	77
Total	57	50	54	55	53	55	61
First Term Attrition	35	32	35	30	28	31	28

The lower career reenlistment rates of the past few years as illustrated in Table 2 highlight the shortfall in experienced personnel the armed forces have been facing (Hunter and Nelson, 1979, p. 17).


Table 2							
Reenlistment Rates (%)							
	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
<u>First Term</u>							
Army	39	21	33	36	43	51	55
Navy	40	35	37	40	38	37	42
Air Force	40	37	39	41	38	36	43
Marine Corps	20	26	29	29	20	23	27
DoD	37	30	35	37	37	39	43
<u>Career</u>							
Army	75	71	70	69	66	69	73
Navy	80	75	68	64	62	67	73
Air Force	90	82	86	82	82	82	86
Marine Corps	73	78	72	69	52	50	74
DoD	82	76	75	72	68	71	77
<u>Total</u>							
Army	53	43	52	54	56	62	68
Navy	58	50	49	50	47	48	55
Air Force	68	62	66	66	60	60	66
Marine Corps	34	41	43	42	34	35	43
DoD	57	50	54	55	53	55	61

Table 2 demonstrates that, historically, approximately one half of all military personnel eligible for discharge from active duty are discharged during any given fiscal year. Because of the ever increasing technological complexity of modern military hardware, there is a growing need to retain personnel who have been trained in various occupations or, failing this, to find some other means of filling the experience shortfall. Two methods of filling

that gap are to recruit occupationally experienced non-prior service individuals or to persuade personnel with prior military service to reenlist in the armed forces. This thesis explores the latter approach; the prospects and utility of recruiting individuals with previous military experience.

For all practical purposes, prior to the all-volunteer force the armed forces of the United States considered manpower a free commodity. This was perhaps due to a military 'draft mentality' that viewed the supply of entry level personnel as relatively inexhaustible. However, with the end of the draft in 1973, the armed forces have been forced to compete for personnel in the open labor market. Each service must now compete for scarce manpower with industry, higher education, and other occupations, as well as with the three other services. Indeed, for a significant portion of the labor pool, especially among the minorities and unskilled, the military must even compete with welfare. The substantial benefits of welfare are often perceived to far outweigh whatever inducements are offered by the armed forces (Muller, 1979, p. A-3).

The available pool of 17-20 year-olds is dwindling (Muller, 1979, p. A-3). Over the past decade the national birth rate has declined substantially. As indicated in Fig. 1.1, demographers expect that by the turn of the century the available pool of 17-20 year-olds will shrink by 20%.



17-20 Year-Old Supply, 1977-1997

Fig. 1.1

Moreover, not every 17-20 year-old, male or female, is eligible for military service. Each recruit must meet minimum moral, mental and physical standards as set by the respective services in order to be eligible for enlistment into a particular service.

Along with the declining birth rate of the past decade, there has been a decrease in the overall educational quality of young recruits. W. E. Muller of George Washington University who has written several papers on forecasting for total force planning, has stated the following:

"With the general decrease of educational standards, the bilingual education requirements being used as a tool of advantage by ethnic minority groups, the 'black language' ruling, the issuance of certificates of attendance in lieu of graduation diplomas, the influx of less qualified refugees (boat people and chicanos), and the 'permissiveness' of parents, the capability of the recruit is deteriorating" (Muller, 1979, p. A-9)

One indication of the increasing complexity of hardware with which modern military personnel must be proficient has been the growth in the number of pages of technical manuals for aircraft (Fig. 1.2). Currently, the Air Force is rewriting and downgrading, at a considerable cost, its maintenance manuals from an eleventh grade level of comprehension to a ninth grade level (Muller, 1979, p. A-9). The decreasing recruit capabilities have led to increased training costs (Muller, 1979, p. A-10).

The spectacular developments in hardware systems, coupled with the unprecedented advances in command and control technology and the introduction of space technology, have imposed heavy requirements on the armed forces for experienced manpower (Binkin and Kyriakopoulos, 1979, p. 17). The experience acquired during the informal education process of on-the-job training, learning by trial and error, and the repetition of tasks is cumulative. These experiences enable personnel to improve their performance as they acquire knowledge and know-how (Binkin and Kyriakopoulos, 1979, p. 29-30). For example, a 1977 study by Horowitz and Sherman on crew characteristics and ship condition supports the long accepted

GROWTH IN AIRCRAFT TECHNICAL MANUALS




Fig. 1.2

hypothesis that experienced personnel make more productive technicians (Horowitz and Sherman, 1977).

The overwhelming evidence from recent studies by Binkin and Kyriakopoulos (1979), Horowitz and Sherman (1977), DeTray (1981), Hawkins (1979) and others points to a increased need for experienced personnel in the military and for less dependence on the "youth and vigor" philosophy of earlier years.

Table 3 provides data which contrast the job-staffing practices of the civilian sector and each of the armed services. The table also indicates roughly the extent to which improvements can be made in the job-staffing practices of the armed services. The improvements to be made would come from a shift toward a more mature force within the technical fields and a reduction in the number of first termers within the occupational categories. This may also help to abolish the age-old military "up or out" promotion policies. It has been demonstrated in the civilian sector (most notably in the aircraft maintenance field) that an individual can be productive and happy and remain in a single grade for an indefinite period of time, provided he/she receives the necessary benefits and pay raises (Muller, 1979, p. 9). There is no need for the military to perpetrate the Peter Principle by continuing to promote each individual to his highest level of incompetence.

Table 3

Age Distribution of Military Enlisted Personnel,
by Service, and of Civilian Sector Male Workers
by Major Occupational Category, 1977

Percent					
Major occupational category	Age				
	17-24	25-34	35-44	Over 44	
<u>Technical workers</u>					
Civilian sector	10	35	23	32	
Army	56	32	11	1	
Navy	54	33	12	1	
Air Force	45	35	18	2	
Marine Corps	67	25	7	1	
<u>Clerical workers</u>					
Civilian sector	25	25	16	34	
Army	47	35	16	2	
Navy	42	38	18	2	
Air Force	37	39	22	2	
Marine Corps	61	26	12	1	
<u>Craftsmen</u>					
Civilian sector	17	27	21	35	
Army	66	25	8	1	
Navy	57	30	12	1	
Air Force	53	33	13	1	
Marine Corps	72	22	6	*	
<u>Other(a)</u>					
Civilian sector	40	20	13	28	
Army	65	26	8	1	
Navy	40	37	21	2	
Air Force	56	30	13	1	
Marine Corps	84	13	3	*	

* Less than 1 percent

a. For civilian sector, includes nonfarm laborers and service workers.

For military, includes "service and supply handlers" and "infantry, gun crews, and seamanship specialists" categories.

From Table 3 it would appear that the services with the largest concentration of technicians and craftsmen--the Navy and the Air Force--would stand to gain the most by moving

toward a more experienced work force. However, the data also suggest that the Army and Marine Corps should consider utilizing more experienced personnel in all occupational areas (Binkin and Kyriakopoulos, 1979, p. 36).

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

It is only recently that interest has been shown by researchers in the area of military recruitment of prior service individuals. Moreover, while veterans have always been a small portion of military accessions, recruiters have not really focused hard on inducing veterans to return to military service. An exception, however, would be when certain ratings are needed for events such as the recommissioning of the battleship New Jersey.

Since veteran recruitment by the military is a relatively new research area, there is very little reported in the literature regarding either this subject or that of prior service accessions. Most of the literature reviewed for this thesis consists of background articles, such as those which deal with possible reasons for manpower shortages and poor quality recruits (Muller, 1979) and the need to recruit experienced personnel (Binkin and Kyriakopoulos, 1979).

There are two articles which deal directly with the question of prior service accessions: one, a thesis written by a Naval Postgraduate School graduate, R. B. Hawkins, LCDR, USN; the other is a contracted study prepared by D. DeTray of Rand Corporation. The Hawkins study focuses on the

effectiveness of the Navy's recruiting of veterans while DeTray explores in detail the demographic make-up of prior service individuals.

The purpose of Hawkins' (1979) thesis was to explore the effectiveness of the six Navy Recruiting Areas in the recruitment of prior service Navy veterans (NAVETS) for the years FY 1975-1978 (pp. 4 & 22). Hawkins examined trends in four general areas: (1), the overall performance trends in prior service recruiting; (2), demographic time trends by fiscal year for prior service NAVETS; (3), occupational time trends and regional accession trends by fiscal year and recruiting area for NAVETS, and (4), NAVETS geographic accession trends, with the six Navy recruiting areas forming the geographic divisions, analyzed by demographics and occupational groupings (p. 22). Individuals studied in Hawkins thesis were an aggregate of prior service Navy veterans plus other service veterans. Individual Navy veteran prior service enlistment data for the time period 1 July 1975 through 30 September 1978 was utilized (p. 22). The data were collected from five primary sources: the USAREC DoD-edited file, the USAREC DoD-edited cohort file for FY1975, the USAREC DoD-edited file (compared with the edited BUPERS Enlisted Master Record), BUPERS Report - NAVPERS 15658 and the Commander Navy Recruiting Command Production Summary Report (p. 27).

Hawkins found that approximately 50% of the male NAVETS reenlisting were between the ages of 20 and 25. During the

time period considered, there was a slow but steady increase in the percentage of NAVETS in the 20 to 25 year-old age group reenlisting. This increase was associated with a decrease in the percentages of NAVETS reenlisting from the 26 to 30 year-old age group (pp. 35-36).

Hawkins, using a chi-square test, determined that there was a significant statistical relationship between the entry paygrade of a NAVET and the year in which the enlistment occurred (p. 37). His analysis of marital status indicated that a greater proportion of the NAVETS reenlisting were single (p. 37). Navy veteran reenlistment by race demonstrated a consistent pattern over the years analyzed (FY1975-FY1978). "The percentages of caucasian, black and other NAVET accessions have remained within one percentage point of a distribution of 86%, and 2% respectively (p. 42)."

Factors analyzed in the Hawkins study indicate that potential market targeting within an area might be accomplished by using demographic data available from separation files (p. 69). Analysis of the prior service veterans attrition indicated that the E-3 and E-4 prior service enlistee experienced a lower rate of attrition than did the non-prior service enlistee (p. 69).

Hawkins' study indicated that certain distinctions probably exist among different regions of the country with respect to the Navy's ability to attract the prior service veteran for reenlistment. Hawkins also stated that with

more specific and in-depth analysis of the market in each Navy recruiting district, more effective prior service recruiting programs could be developed to meet existing service needs (pp. 72-73).

DeTray (1981) explored in some detail an alternative source of military manpower: veterans who are currently employed in the civilian sector in jobs with close military counterparts (p. v). Using the 1979 Current Population Survey (CPS) and the 1966-1976 National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men (NLS), DeTray explored some of the civilian and military characteristics of the prior service accessions pool. Based on data retrieved from the 1979 CPS, DeTray found that for the most part veterans were employed (p. vii). Approximately one half of those veterans who served short terms and had only recently separated from the military earned less at their civilian jobs than they would had they returned to active duty (p. vii). However, for veterans in their thirties with significant military and civilian experience, only about one fifth would earn more by returning to active duty (p. viii).

DeTray examined prior service accessions in detail to determine whether this group would serve as a basis for further analysis (p. 4). He concluded that the area of prior service accessions should be researched further. He stated that:

"Depending on the degree of disaggregation required, the NLS data, in conjunction with information from CPS files, could allow manpower planners to estimate the size of veteran pools by a variety of civilian and military characteristics" (p. 34).

There are presently several projects under way which focus on prior service accession. Dennis DeTray of Rand Corporation is continuing his project; the Naval Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego, has a project under the directorship of Meryl Baker, and S. Stephenson of Penn State University has been contracted by the Navy Recruiting Command to conduct studies in the field of prior service accessions.

C. PRESENT POLICY

Present policies concerning the reenlistment of veterans are not attractive for veteran recruitment. Indeed they are generally punitive in that veterans take a reduction in pay on reentering the military. There has been, and still is very little direct effort made by the military to attract the prior service individual back to active duty. Those who do return to active duty do so mainly on their own initiative.

Eligibility requirements for prior service accessions differ from those of non-prior service in two main areas: age and training. Prior service individuals are not limited to the 17 to 35 age bracket as are non-prior service personnel, but may only exceed the upper limit if they have three years of service and their age does not exceed 35 plus

their years of service up to a maximum age of 55. For example, in the Navy an individual may reenlist at any age to 55 provided he can complete enough active duty time to qualify for transfer to the fleet reserve prior to reaching his 55th birthday or 30 years of active duty prior to age 65. On the other hand, education requirements for prior service and non-prior service personnel are generally equal.

The major difference between the prior service and non-prior service accessions is in training requirements. Previous training is not required for non-prior service personnel and each recruit is required to attend basic training. Prior service personnel are restricted by their previous occupational specialty training as to available programs under which they may reenlist unless their training in the civilian sector is more useful to the particular service at that point in time. A prior service individual may also be required to repeat basic training before reporting to his ultimate duty station. The need for basic training is determined by the length of time an individual has been off active duty. For a person reenlisting in the Navy the broken service time limit is four years. After this, a reenlistee must attend basic training a second time. The Army grants a five year length of broken service before attendance at a recruit training camp is mandatory.

The availability of advanced training and/or other programs available to the prior service accession depends on several factors: paygrade at the time of initial separation, length of service, occupational specialty, and, finally, length of broken service.

Each of the services is generally alike in its policies regarding reenlistment of prior service personnel, with differences occurring in time limits, programs available, and quotas. Navy applicants who separated in paygrade E-4 and above with less than four years of broken service must apply for reenlistment in Group A or B of the Open Rates/Skills list (Appendix A), and pass a substitute Navy-wide advancement examination for the rate and rating desired (COMNAVCRUITCOMINST 1130.8B, 1982, p. 5-3). The term of reenlistment is 2-6 years, depending on the program for which an individual is enlisting, the reenlistment code and the paygrade at the time of release from active duty.

Applicants in paygrade E-4 and above with greater than four years of broken service must apply for reenlistment through the Direct Procurement Enlistment Program (DPEP) which may place an individual in a critically manned rating in a petty officer status, paygrade E-4 through E-7 (COMNAVCRUITCOMINST 1130.8B, 1982, p. 6-IV-2). If a reenlisting individual possesses a valid Navy Enlisted Classification Code record and test scores meet or exceed the requirements, no qualification tests are required. The

term of enlistment under DPEP is four years. One penalty in the reenlistment of prior service personnel in the Navy is that if they reenlist and subsequently retire, any severance or adjustment pay previously received will be recouped from their retirement pay (COMNAVCRUITCOMINST 1130.8B, 1982, p. 5-3).

For a prior service accession some of the most important regulations are those which establish his reentry paygrade. Generally, the longer the length of broken service, the lower the entry paygrade. The penalty for broken service depends upon the length of broken service and the individual's separation paygrade. The Army sets out its reenlistment options fairly explicitly in Army Regulation 601-210.

For example, an Army veteran who leaves the service in paygrade E-1 through E-6 with six or fewer years of active duty may reenlist within twenty-four months of separation at their separation paygrade. Those individuals with seven to ten years of active duty may not reenlist within three months of separation and must accept a reduction of one paygrade if they reenlist with three to thirty months of broken service. Individuals who have been separated for thirty to thirty-five months must accept a reduction of two paygrades below their separation paygrade and someone who has been separated for thirty-six months or more must accept a reduction of three paygrades (De Tray, 1981, p. 9). Table 4 summarizes the Army's paygrade regulations for prior service accessions (DeTray, 1981, p. 10).

Table 4

Reenlistment Paygrades for Prior Service Accessions
Army

Separation Paygrade	Length of Separation (months)	Reentry Paygrade (a)
E1 to E6 (6 years of service or less	< 24 25-30 31-36 > 3	Same as separation paygrade 1 paygrade reduction 2 paygrades reduction 3 paygrades reduction
E1 to E6 (7-10 years of service)	< 3 4-30 31-36 > 36	Not allowed 1 paygrade reduction 2 paygrades reduction 3 paygrades reduction
E7 and above; and E6 and below with 10 years or more of service	< 3 > 3	Not allowed As determined by Cdr USAEEA, but at least one paygrade lower than separation paygrade

SOURCE: Army Regulation 601-210, Table 2-6, p. 2-11. These guidelines apply to the Army specifically, but the same trend of lowering reentry paygrade with increased length of separation is found in the other Services.

a. Reentry paygrade is never lower than E-2 unless separation paygrade was E-1.

The regulations governing the return of a veteran to active duty tend to penalize the older and more experienced individuals who are needed in today's technically oriented armed forces.

The succeeding chapters of this thesis explore several prior service accession questions. Chapter II will look at the available pool of prior service personnel with regard to total numbers and quality as determined by education level, mental category and character of service. Chapter III will

explore the characteristics of those personnel with broken service who have returned to active duty from July 1975 to September 1981. Chapter IV will analyze the attrition of these prior service accessions. That is, those individuals who are released from active duty prior to completion of their contract. Chapter V will summarize conclusions made in the preceeding chapters and elaborate on policy recommendations concerning prior service accessions.

II. THE AVAILABLE POOL

This study of prior service accessions begins with an analysis of the pool of personnel available for reenlistment. For purposes of this study a veteran available for reenlistment is defined as a veteran who has served a minimum of two years on active duty and is between the ages of 19 and 35. The lower value of 19 allows an individual who initially enlisted at age 17 to have completed two years on active duty while the upper value of 35 is the legal maximum age at which an individual may enlist without an age waiver. Over the time period 1 July 1975 to 30 September 1981 approximately 3,542,000 male veterans were discharged from active duty with at least two years of active duty service. Upon discharge from active duty an individual is assigned a reenlistment eligibility code which is based upon his character of service and the reason for separation as indicated by an Interservice Separation Code (ISC). For purposes of this study personnel were grouped into three reenlistment categories. An individual, upon discharge, was either eligible or ineligible for reenlistment or his reenlistment eligibility was unknown.

From 1 July 1975 to 30 September 1981 57.96% of the approximately 3,542,000 discharges were categorized as eligible for reenlistment. Those ineligible to reenlist accounted for 37.54% of the total while only 4.51% were in the unknown eligibility category (Table 5).

Table 5

DoD
Available Pool
FY1975-FY1981

	Eligible	Ineligible	Unknown	Total
Army	57.58	36.71	5.71	1,399,562
Navy	55.26	40.94	3.79	775,357
Air Force	62.16	33.35	4.49	1,007,287
Marine Corps	53.45	45.10	1.45	360,080
DoD	57.96	37.54	4.51	3,542,286

A. AGE AT SEPARATION

The number of 19 to 35 year-old personnel separating account for 46.47% of the total number of discharges for the period in question, FY1975-FY1981. They also account for 55.0% of the total number of veterans eligible for reenlistment, and 32.44% of the total ineligible for reenlistment. Table 6 illustrates the reenlistment eligibility of the available pool by each age between the ages of 19 and 35. Noteworthy is the data for 19 year-olds of which the majority, 58.51%, are ineligible to reenlist.

For each age the percent eligible for reenlistment increases slightly but steadily up to age 34 at which time the percent enligible plummets from 82.73% to 58.97% at age 35.

Table 6

DoD - Available Pool
 Age at Separation
 FY1975-FY1981

	Eligible	Ineligible	Unknown	Total
Age				
19	35.24	58.51	6.24	37618
20	48.81	45.90	5.29	145722
21	61.89	33.68	4.44	254986
22	69.97	26.09	3.94	283356
23	71.57	24.21	4.22	194452
24	72.04	23.08	4.88	128005
25	72.43	21.63	5.94	101269
26	74.62	18.84	6.55	94565
27	75.28	17.74	6.98	81328
28	75.27	17.75	6.98	61993
29	76.88	15.78	7.34	50752
30	78.30	13.50	8.19	46513
31	79.02	12.48	8.50	37298
32	78.92	12.26	8.82	29900
33	81.94	9.48	8.58	31204
34	82.73	7.84	9.44	33815
35	58.97	31.45	9.58	40296

Table 7 looks at the age at separation data in another light. That is, within the age group of 19 to 35, the percentage of the total group accounted for by each age-eligibility category. Each individual has served at least two years on active duty therefore those separating between the ages of 19 and 23 are assumed to be separating at the conclusion of or during their first enlistment based on the fact that the majority of enlistments are for four years.

As indicated by the data in Table 7, 51.3% of the reenlistment eligible personnel are in the 19 to 23 year-old bracket. Within this same age bracket 68.6% of the reenlistment ineligible personnel are accounted for while 44.2%

Table 7

DoD - Available Pool
Age Percent of Total
FY1975-FY1981

	Eligible	Ineligible	Unknown
Age			
19	1.17	5.10	2.54
20	6.30	15.51	8.36
21	13.97	19.91	12.27
22	17.55	17.14	12.09
23	12.32	10.91	8.09
24	8.16	6.85	6.77
25	6.49	5.08	6.52
26	6.25	4.13	6.71
27	5.42	3.34	6.15
28	4.13	2.55	4.69
29	3.45	1.86	4.04
30	3.22	1.46	4.13
31	2.61	1.08	3.44
32	2.09	.85	2.86
33	2.26	.69	2.90
34	2.48	.61	3.46
35	2.10	2.94	4.18
(N)	1129442	431365	92265

of the unknown eligibility fall into this age bracket. The large percentage of ineligible personnel in this age bracket may indicate that they did not complete their initial term of enlistment, first term attrites.

B. EDUCATION LEVEL

The education level of separating personnel was grouped into two major categories; high school graduates and non-high school graduates. The high school graduate (HSG) category includes all personnel who possess a high school diploma plus those who have some college. The non-high school graduate (NHS) category includes all personnel who do

not possess a high school diploma plus those who have attained a General Education Diploma (G.E.D.). Table 8 indicates that for the Department of Defense the majority of separating high school graduates are eligible for reenlistment while the majority of non-high school graduates are ineligible for reenlistment. This same trend holds for each service with the exception of the Air Force. Although not a very large difference, the percentage of non-high school graduates separating from the Air Force eligible for reenlistment is higher than those that are ineligible. The Air Force also has the highest percentage of unknown eligibility among non-high school graduates. This may account for the small difference between the eligible and ineligible categories and the Air Force may in-fact be more in-line with the other services in the area of non-high school graduate eligibility.

Table 8

DoD - Available Pool
HSG versus NHS
FY1975-FY1981

		Eligible	Ineligible	Unknown	Total
Army	HSG	59.99	34.39	5.62	1171563
	NHS	45.18	48.66	6.16	227999
Navy	HSG	58.15	34.46	3.39	656095
	NHS	39.39	54.47	6.04	119262
Air Force	HSG	62.96	32.91	4.13	959743
	NHS	46.10	42.28	11.62	47544
Marine Corps	HSG	60.46	38.40	1.15	268889
	NHS	32.79	64.86	2.34	91191
DoD	HSG	60.57	35.15	4.28	3056290
	NHS	41.52	52.53	5.95	485996

C. MENTAL CATEGORY

On 1 January 1976 the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) was introduced as the single DoD test to replace the various aptitude test batteries then in use by each Service. The scores obtained by an individual on the ASVAB are used for two purposes: (1) they help to determine individuals eligible for enlistment and (2) they are used to establish qualifications for assignment to specific military occupations. The ASVAB consists of ten subtests, as shown in Table 9. Research and experience have demonstrated that these ten subtests are acceptable predictors of success in various types of military job training.

Table 9

The Ten Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) Subtests

ASVAB Subtests (Forms 8, 9, and 10)

- | | |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| * Arithmetic Reasoning | * General Science |
| * Numerical Operations | * Mathematics Knowledge |
| * Paragraph Comprehension | * Electronics Information |
| * Word Knowledge | * Mechanical Comprehension |
| * Coding Speed | * Automotive Shop Information |

The Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score is a combination of an individuals' ASVAB subtest scores in the four areas of word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, arithmetic reasoning, and numerical operation. An individuals' AFQT score, supplemented by scores on various composites of aptitude subtests, is used in conjunction with educational,

medical, and moral standards to determine an applicant's eligibility to enter specific military occupational categories.

An error in the calibration of the ASVAB form used from January 1976 to September 1980 resulted in inaccurate category designations for some recruits thus inflating the AFQT scores of low-scoring enlistees. The miscalibration problem was corrected by an introduction of a new and properly calibrated test form in October 1980. Additionally, the inflated test score for 1976-1980 were recomputed and the corrected norms made available. The recomputation of test scores resulted in a significant decrease in the percentages of mental category III recruits and a corresponding increase in Category IV-V enlistees. The data presented throughout this thesis on mental category of personnel is based upon the recomputed scores and thus standardized with the other years in question.

Historically, the largest percentages of accessions have been in mental categories II, IIIA and IIIB (Table 10). This is by policy design, however the data presented in Table 10 indicates that for the period 1 July 1975 to 30 September 1981 category IV-V personnel accounted for a larger percentage of accessions than did category I, 9.02% versus 4.46% respectively. It should be noted that over the time period in question the Air Force did not recruit any personnel in mental category V and the Marine Corps only

accessed 1 person in category V. Therefore the data presented for mental category IV-V is primarily Army and Navy accessions.

Table 10

DoD - Available Pool
AFQT (Mental Category)
FY1975-FY1981

	I	II	IIIA	IIIB	IV-V	UNK
N	158039	977391	676043	780144	319525	631144
%	4.46	27.59	19.08	22.02	9.02	17.82

Because of the technological advances in military hardware and command and control systems there has been a push to recruit only from upper mental category personnel, I-IIIA. Table 11 demonstrates the character of service as indicated by individual eligibility to reenlist for all mental categories for those individuals separating from active duty between 1 July 1975 and 30 September 1981. As the data indicates, the majority of personnel in each mental category are eligible for reenlistment. Noteworthy is the apparent inversion at the mental category IIIB and IV-V point indicating that a larger percentage of category IV-V personnel are eligible for reenlistment than category IIIB personnel.

Over all mental categories the majority, 57.96% of separations were eligible for reenlistment.

Table 11

DoD - Available Pool
Eligibility by Mental Category
FY1975-FY1981

	Eligible	Ineligible	Unknown	Total
I	66.17	29.12	4.70	158039
II	63.23	32.78	3.99	977391
IIIA	59.62	36.30	4.08	676043
IIIB	56.25	39.45	4.29	780144
IV-V	57.49	37.72	4.79	319525
UNK	48.29	45.86	5.85	631144
	2052982	1329602	159702	3542286
% of Total	57.96	37.54	4.51	

D. PAYGRADE

Within the armed forces an accepted proxy measure of individual experience and skill level is paygrade. For this reason the approximate skill level of the available pool is estimated by using separation paygrade. Historically, the majority of individuals separate from active duty in paygrade E-4 or E-5. The attainment of these paygrades is commensurate with the length of service requirements for advancement which can be reached during the initial term of enlistment, normally 4 to 6 years. Thus indicating that the majority of separations occur at the end of the first enlistment.

Table 12 presents the eligibility for reenlistment by paygrade at the time of separation of the available pool for the time period FY1975-FY1981. The data indicates that the majority of non-rated (E-1 to E-3) personnel who separated were ineligible to reenlist. There is a dramatic jump at

the E-4 level for all services in the percent of separating personnel eligible for reenlistment. For Dod, the percent eligible reaches a peak at the E-5 level and begins a decline to the E-8 level at which time the number of ineligible personnel becomes the majority. Within each service the percent of eligibles reaches its peak at a different paygrade and the shift to ineligible occurs at a different point. Individual service data is presented in Appendix B. However, the shift from eligible to ineligible among the senior personnel, E-7 to E-9, is commensurate with a twenty-year length of service and retirement.

Table 12

DoD - Available Pool
Separation Paygrade (SEPPG)
FY1975-FY1981

SEPPG	Eligible	Ineligible	Unknown	Total
E-1	4.62	90.47	5.27	104853
E-2	12.85	79.90	7.25	122780
E-3	28.18	66.95	4.86	309730
E-4	67.72	29.06	3.22	1249124
E-5	72.15	23.45	4.40	839255
E-6	62.77	31.43	5.80	469205
E-7	47.18	47.04	5.79	303781
E-8	40.83	53.44	5.73	99468
E-9	35.36	58.84	5.80	44008
UNK	64.63	14.63	20.73	82
(N)	2052982	1329602	159702	3542286

E. LENGTH OF SERVICE

Table 13 lists the total active federal military service (TAFMS) for those individuals separating from active duty in FY1975 through FY1981. The length of service is in months

for Table 13 and initially starts at the 24 month point. From the two-year point to the seven-year point the table is grouped by six month intervals, after that, in 24 month intervals until the 30 year point is reached at which time there is a 60 month interval due to the small number of personnel in this group. The majority, 60.86%, of separations occurred prior to, or at the 72 month point indicating that most enlistees separate at the end of the first enlistment. Table 13 indicates that for the most part separating personnel are eligible for reenlistment until they reach the 217-240 month point, 18 to 20 years, at which time the eligibility for reenlistment shifts dramatically to the ineligible category. There is also a shift at the 25-30 month point to the ineligible category due most likely to no service having a term of enlistment between two and three years and these separations are occurring prior to completion of the enlistment contract. There are peaks at the 36, 48 and 72 month points for the eligible category which coincides with the successful completion of 3, 4 and 6 year enlistment contracts. After the 72 month point there is a steady rise in the percent of those eligible for reenlistment to the 240 month (20 year) point, at which time the percentage of reenlistment eligible personnel drops significantly.

Table 13

DoD - Available Pool
Total Active Federal Military Service (TAFMS)
FY1975-FY1981

	Eligible	Ineligible	Unknown	Total
TAFMS (mos)				
24	60.71	35.44	3.86	120584
25-30	31.19	60.96	7.85	196869
31-36	55.27	41.25	3.48	605916
37-42	51.60	40.86	7.54	181580
43-48	68.16	29.94	1.90	661954
49-54	59.27	36.12	4.61	117775
55-60	59.52	35.92	4.56	90648
61-66	59.19	35.08	5.73	60439
67-72	68.89	28.38	2.73	124075
73-96	67.00	28.66	4.34	306286
97-120	71.70	24.58	3.72	195307
121-144	72.42	23.17	4.41	153480
145-168	74.73	20.80	4.47	91984
169-192	78.09	16.69	5.23	112419
193-216	72.42	20.57	7.01	69513
217-240	36.09	54.82	9.09	150016
241-264	22.73	71.23	6.04	166961
265-288	33.85	57.92	8.23	66998
289-312	30.86	63.52	5.62	27958
313-336	22.69	70.93	6.38	26387
337-360	6.68	85.69	7.63	10873
361-420	5.56	87.20	7.23	4259
(N)				3542286

F. SUMMARY

The data presented indicates that the majority of people separate after the first term of enlistment and are eligible for reenlistment. However, the majority of 19 year-olds separating from active duty are ineligible for reenlistment indicating that they failed to complete their initial term of enlistment.

Overall, the majority of high school graduates separating are eligible for reenlistment while the majority of non-high school graduates are ineligible for reenlistment.

Mental category does not appear to play a large part in the eligibility of an individual to reenlist. The percent of personnel in the upper mental categories eligible for reenlistment is greater than for mental category IV-V. Eligible personnel are the majority for each mental category.

A decided majority of non-rated (E-1 to E-3) personnel separations are ineligible to reenlist. The majority of individuals separating in paygrades E-4 to E-6 are eligible for reenlistment. Senior enlisted personnel E-7 to E-9, are ineligible for reenlistment. This is commensurate with the completion of a twenty-year career.

Eligibility to reenlist, by length of service, peaks at intervals which coincide with normal enlistment contract lengths. After the six-year point the percentage of eligible personnel increases to the twenty-year point at which time the majority of personnel are ineligible.

III. THE PRIOR SERVICE ACCESSANT

Prior service accessions analyzed in this chapter were drawn from the eligible pool discussed in the previous chapter. In this thesis a veteran is considered to have had prior service only if he completed a minimum of two years on active duty. Time served in the reserves is not considered as active duty. Since each of the services has a different definition of prior service, ranging from 24 hours on active duty for the Army, to 6 months for the Air Force, a common starting point had to be determined for this study. The common length of service was set at two years of active duty.

The criterion of two years of active duty was used to eliminate those who did not successfully complete recruit training or who, for one reason or another, were discharged early. The two-year time limit should give most individuals the time to complete recruit training, basic skill training, and to reach an operational unit for first hand experience. The two year time limit is the minimum term of enlistment for which an individual may enlist in any branch.

A. AGE AT SEPARATION

The first aspect of the prior service accession explored in this study was age at initial separation from active duty. Many studies contrasting military and civilian labor forces point to the age disparities of their labor forces with the younger military work force due to its focus on youth and vigor (Binkin and Kyriakolopoulos, 1979).

Over the years FY1975-FY1981 the military accessed approximately 106,000 male prior service accessions, only 3.02% of the prior service personnel available. Individuals aged 16 and below have been omitted from the data as errors while those aged 17 and 18 were omitted as probably reservists not previously screened out and therefore ineligible for consideration in this study.

A comparison over FY1975-FY1981 of the distribution of age at time of first enlistment and the distribution of age at initial separation given in Fig. 3.1 indicates that the majority of first enlistments occur between the ages of 17 and 20 while the majority of initial separations occur between the ages of 27 and 23. The age at separation is commensurate with the completion of an initial term of enlistment of 4 years. Fig. 3.1 indicates a steady decline in the number of enlistments at each age from 18 through 32 with a surprising number of individuals enlisting for the first time between the ages of 33 and 36.

PRIOR SERVICE ACCESSIONS
AGE AT ENTRY VS AGE AT SEPARATION
FY1975-FY1981




Fig. 3.1

The numbers separating at each age declines steadily from age 22 to age 35 at which point the number of separations increases again reaching a peak at ages 37 and 38. This peak coincides with the completion of a twenty-year career at which time an individual may retire at 50 percent of his base pay.

B. AGE AT REENTRY

Fig. 3.2 illustrates the age distribution of male prior-service accessions between the ages of 19 and 35 for FY1975 through FY1981. The small group of 19 year-olds represents those persons who initially enlisted at 17 and served a two-year term of enlistment. The age of 35 is the upper limit for which no age waivers are required for a veteran returning to active duty. Also, beyond age 35 the percent of total prior service accessions for any age is less than 0.4% with a frequency per age of less than 100. The majority of individuals returning to active duty were in the 21 to 26 age bracket with a peak at the 23 year old point. This peak parallels the age at separation illustrated in Fig. 3.1.

Table 14 demonstrates that of those individuals returning to active duty during the time period FY1975-FY1981 the majority, 51.8%, were in the 22-25 age bracket. The next largest number of returning personnel fall into the 26-29 age bracket, 27.23% followed by the 30-35 year olds with 10.02%. Finally, the youngest group of prior service

DOD

PRIOR SERVICE ACCESSIONS

AGE AT REENTRY

FY1975-FY1981




Fig. 3.2

accessions, 19-21 year-olds, accounts for the remaining 9.68%. The percentages presented are based on 106,906 records from a total of 107,812 records scanned. (The missing 906 records represent age groups outside the 19-35 age bracket.)

Table 14

DoD
Prior Service Accession
Age at Reentry
FY1975-FY1981

Age	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	DoD
19	.33	.28	.05	.27	.28 (298)
20	2.86	1.82	.24	2.93	2.21 (2365)
21	9.47	6.15	1.42	10.24	7.48 (7994)
22	15.28	12.42	5.84	17.39	13.41 (14339)
23	15.31	14.69	12.24	18.31	15.00 (16035)
24	13.09	13.35	13.54	15.24	13.40 (14323)
25	11.18	10.98	12.97	10.86	11.27 (12049)
26	9.06	9.28	13.23	8.00	9.49 (10149)
27	6.99	7.67	11.23	5.52	7.57 (8088)
28	5.18	6.30	9.06	3.88	5.89 (6299)
29	3.5	4.77	6.06	2.69	4.17 (4459)
30	2.70	3.81	4.60	1.80	3.24 (3459)
31	1.90	2.71	3.81	1.16	2.34 (2497)
32	1.35	2.25	2.62	.74	1.77 (1888)
33	.86	1.61	1.53	.55	1.18 (1258)
34	.61	1.04	.99	.29	.78 (835)
35	.33	.87	.56	.13	.53 (571)
(N)	(48241)	(39104)	(11166)	(8395)	(106906)

C. AFQT - MENTAL CATEGORY

Mental category is determined by the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) administered when an individual initially applies for enlistment in the armed forces. The mental category of an individual is one criterion on which the recruiter bases the available choices of occupational

specialty to offer the prospective recruit. The more technically oriented occupations are reserved for the higher mental category recruits. The military would like to recruit all mental category I personnel but this is not possible. Over the years the largest percentages of personnel have been in mental categories II, IIIA, and IIIB. For purposes of comparison in this study categories IVA, IVB, IVC and V were consolidated into one category, IV-V.

Data on the mental category of those veterans returning to active duty indicate that a larger percentage of returning veterans fall into mental category II (see Table 15). The percentages of accessions in categories II through IIIB for the entire Department of Defense are fairly constant but there are wide disparities among the individual services as illustrated in Table 16.

Table 15

DoD
AFQT (Mental Category)
FY1975-FY1981

FY	Mental Category					
	I	II	IIIA	IIIB	IV-V	UNK
75	3.01	24.88	15.81	19.74	16.86	19.71
76	2.86	23.62	17.89	19.54	15.84	20.25
77	2.40	25.79	18.20	22.33	13.76	17.52
78	3.17	26.79	21.04	24.11	12.85	12.04
79	2.83	27.24	21.60	26.49	11.94	9.90
80	2.87	28.29	23.12	27.51	10.39	7.81
81	3.03	26.74	23.97	29.89	9.51	6.86

As demonstrated in Table 16, the Air Force has the largest percentage of accessions in mental categories I and

II for each fiscal year 1975 to 1981. Both the Army and the Navy have a high percentage of accessions in mental category IV-V. The Marine Corps has an inordinate percent of accessions whose mental category is unknown. Over the years under consideration that percentage does decline but even in FY1981 21.35% of the Marine Corps accessions mental category were unknown.

Table 16

AFQT Comparison by Service
FY1975-FY1981

FY	75	76	77	78	79	80	81
				I			
Army	2.21	2.48	1.89	2.09	2.43	2.47	2.69
Navy	4.06	3.43	3.07	3.93	2.97	2.96	3.20
A/F	6.85	7.10	5.44	6.23	5.24	4.04	4.07
M/C	.40	.36	.22	1.25	1.44	2.16	2.05
				II			
Army	21.04	21.22	23.75	23.02	23.16	24.23	21.86
Navy	32.77	29.99	30.90	30.58	30.10	29.52	28.46
A/F	38.75	38.77	40.77	38.20	38.32	37.78	37.75
M/C	4.76	4.52	3.50	14.18	23.11	23.90	24.08
				IIIA			
Army	17.38	20.05	20.51	22.66	22.07	21.99	21.63
Navy	15.34	16.50	17.26	18.91	21.08	23.20	25.45
A/F	18.72	18.62	23.24	25.38	22.05	26.76	27.79
M/C	3.77	3.81	3.18	16.56	20.90	21.39	22.92
				IIIB			
Army	23.95	22.97	25.82	28.36	31.83	33.22	36.43
Navy	17.58	19.14	21.24	21.72	22.40	24.92	26.51
A/F	12.02	16.12	18.99	18.97	22.05	21.67	23.01
M/C	6.61	6.55	7.23	18.57	21.00	24.11	24.92
				IV-V			
Army	20.32	19.08	16.27	15.71	14.42	13.47	13.24
Navy	15.67	16.13	13.33	13.23	12.04	10.52	8.49
A/F	7.87	4.79	4.52	5.26	5.39	4.78	4.04
M/C	6.68	5.48	3.83	4.39	5.37	5.37	4.68
				UNK			
Army	15.10	14.19	11.30	8.16	6.10	4.61	4.14
Navy	14.57	14.81	14.21	11.84	11.41	8.88	7.88
A/F	15.80	14.49	7.04	5.97	6.94	4.97	3.83
M/C	77.78	79.29	82.04	45.04	28.19	23.07	21.35

D. PAYGRADE

Age may be an acceptable proxy measure of individual maturity, but it is an inadequate measure of skill level. Within the armed forces an accepted measure of skill level is paygrade. As indicated in Table 17, over the time period FY1975-FY1981 the majority, of prior service accessions initially separated from active duty in paygrades E-4 and E-5.

Table 17
DoD
Separation Paygrade
FY1975-FY1981

FY	75	76	77	78	79	80	81
N	19491	9011	11802	11146	13818	18326	24878
Paygrade							
E1-2	.6	.7	.6	.6	.6	.8	.6
E-3	10.9	12.3	10.9	9.9	10.1	11.3	10.8
E-4	52.0	51.6	57.7	57.9	58.1	56.4	55.2
E-5	31.3	30.4	26.1	25.8	24.9	25.3	26.6
E-6	4.8	4.5	4.4	5.3	5.8	5.8	6.4
E7-9	.4	.5	.3	.4	.5	.4	.5

In contrast with the separation paygrade illustrated in Table 17, Table 18 indicates that of those who returned to active duty 65%-72% reenlisted in paygrades E-3 and E-4, a reduction on the average of one paygrade. This supports the earlier discussion in Chapter I regarding the punitive nature of the regulations governing the reenlistment of veterans.

Table 18

DoD
Entry Paygrade
FY1975 - FY1981

FY	75	76	77	78	79	80	81
N	18275	9011	11797	11146	13791	18434	24871
E-1	4.6	1.0	1.3	1.1	1.7	1.3	.9
E-2	14.5	15.0	12.3	10.9	11.4	10.4	10.4
E-3	24.8	27.8	25.7	25.9	27.1	28.8	25.6
E-4	39.7	38.0	45.8	44.1	42.0	40.1	41.4
E-5	14.0	15.7	12.5	14.5	13.8	15.4	17.3
E-6	2.1	2.2	2.2	3.1	3.7	3.7	4.1
E7-9	.2	.4	.2	.3	.4	.3	.3

Indeed, some of the most important regulations governing prior service accessions are those which establish the individual's returning paygrade. A returning veterans reentry paygrade is determined by a combination of his initial separation paygrade and the length of broken service. Table 19 indicates by fiscal year the distribution of paygrade loss of returnees across DoD. The data show that the majority of people returning have done so with no loss in paygrade.

Table 19

DoD
Paygrade Loss
FY1975-FY1981

FY	75	76	77	78	79	80	81
N	19493	9011	11809	11146	13818	18438	24877
LOPG							
0	51.3	58.0	60.3	62.3	60.4	62.6	65.2
1	20.1	22.8	23.3	23.1	23.9	23.0	21.5
2	14.3	13.7	12.2	11.1	11.9	11.3	10.5
3	7.6	5.2	3.9	3.1	3.1	2.7	2.6
4+	6.5	.3	.4	.4	.7	.4	.2

LOPG Loss of Paygrade

Table 20 indicates percentages of individuals by length of broken service (LOBS) and paygrade loss who returned to active duty during FY1975-FY1981. The paygrade loss is the amount of reduction in paygrade suffered by a returning veteran.

Table 20

DoD Paygrade Loss by Length of Broken Service FY1975-FY1981						
LOBS (mos)	Reduction					(N)
	0	1	2	3	4	
0-3	86.3	7.6	2.3	1.4	2.4	14979
4-6	83.4	12.3	2.4	.9	1.0	15227
7-9	76.6	17.5	3.3	1.3	1.4	10297
10-12	76.9	17.2	3.2	1.3	1.5	9568
13-15	74.0	18.8	4.6	1.5	1.0	7801
16-18	74.2	18.7	4.3	1.6	1.2	6842
19-24	73.1	19.6	4.2	1.9	1.2	12654
25-30	34.9	55.0	6.9	1.9	1.5	7975
31-48	30.7	26.7	32.8	8.0	1.8	16810
49+	16.4	32.3	35.6	14.2	1.5	13883

Additional insight can be gained by looking at the same data in a different manner. Table 21 indicates the percentages of prior service accessions suffering a loss of paygrade by their length of broken service. Through the 18 month point the figures represent the number of accessions on a quarterly basis. Between 19 and 30 months the figures are based on the accessions for six month time periods and there are 18 months of accessions between 31 and 48 months. Finally, any accessions with 49 months or more of broken service are consolidated into the category 49+ months.

Table 21 indicates that 59.6% of those who have returned to active duty have done so without a loss in paygrade. Of those who have returned to active duty, 54.7% returned within one year of separation.

Table 21

DoD
Length of Broken Service by Paygrade Loss
FY1975-FY1981

	Reduction				
	0	1	2	3	4
LOBS(mos)					
0-3	19.3	4.5	2.5	4.5	20.5
4-6	12.8	7.4	2.7	2.9	9.2
7-9	11.7	7.2	2.5	2.8	8.3
10-12	10.9	6.5	2.2	2.7	7.6
13-15	8.6	5.9	2.6	2.6	4.7
16-18	7.5	5.1	2.2	2.4	5.1
19-24	13.8	9.9	3.9	5.2	8.6
25-30	4.1	17.5	4.1	3.3	6.8
31-48	7.7	17.9	40.6	29.8	17.2
49+	3.4	18.2	36.7	43.7	12.2
(N)	(59.6)	(22.2)	(12.3)	(4.1)	(1.7)
(107812)	(64240)	(24075)	(13272)	(4443)	(1782)

Over the years covered by this study the percentages of persons returning by length of broken service have remained fairly constant as indicated by Table 22.

Table 22

DoD
Length of Broken Service by Fiscal Year of Entry
FY1975-FY1981

FY N	75 19493	76 9011	77 11802	78 11146	79 13818	80 18438	81 24877
LOBS(mos)							
0-3	16.2	14.1	15.1	13.5	11.8	11.2	11.8
4-6	8.1	10.3	10.9	11.2	10.8	10.7	9.6
7-9	8.1	9.9	8.6	9.6	9.0	10.5	9.3
10-12	8.1	7.2	8.5	9.0	8.4	9.0	9.1
13-15	6.6	5.7	7.3	7.4	7.1	7.1	7.2
16-18	6.0	5.6	6.0	6.7	5.9	5.6	6.5
19-24	11.9	11.4	11.7	11.6	12.0	10.0	11.0
25-30	7.7	7.3	6.5	6.5	7.6	6.5	7.0
31-48	19.0	14.8	13.1	12.7	14.1	14.9	13.6
49+	8.3	13.9	12.2	11.8	13.3	14.5	15.0

Table 23 shows that of the approximately 81,000 prior-service accessions from 1 July 1975 through 30 September 1981, 50.9% reenlisted for a four-year term of enlistment. Two-year enlistments accounted for 20.9% of the returnees, followed by three-year termers at 20.1% and with only 7.57% enlisting for six years.

Table 23

DoD
Term of Enlistment
FY1975-FY1981

TOE	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	DoD	(N)
0	.02	.03	.01	.13	.03	(26)
1	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	(12)
2	.05	43.28	.05	64.93	20.90	(17065)
3	38.06	4.17	.08	17.67	20.14	(16442)
4	60.74	32.15	99.76	16.84	50.90	(41564)
5	.24	.89	.02	.05	.44	(359)
6	.87	19.48	.06	.37	7.57	(6183)

* 0 Unknown

E. SUMMARY

Veterans returning to active duty are for the most part between the ages of 21 and 26. The largest percentage of prior service accessions, 17.4%, were age 23 at the time of their reenlistment.

The largest percentage of returning veterans are in mental category II, IIIA and IIIB. However, the extremely large percentage of people whose mental category is not known casts doubt on the reliability of these data.

The majority of prior service accessions initially separated in paygrades E-4 and E-5 and reenlisted in paygrades E-3 and E-4. Over the years FY1975-FY1981 51.3% to 65.2% of returnees reenlisted with no loss in paygrade. However, the majority of those returning without a loss in paygrade returned within one year of separation, Table 20.

The majority, 50.9%, of prior service accessions from 1 July 1975 through 30 September 1981 reenlisted for four years.

IV. PRIOR SERVICE ATTRITION

Attrition, as defined for use within this study, is the loss of an individual from active duty status prior to completion of his enlistment contract. Within the armed forces there are ten major official categories (Interservice Separation Codes, ISC) for the separation of an individual from active duty. Each of these ten categories has numerous sub-categories which further define the specific reasons for an individuals' release from active duty. Table 24 lists the ten major Interservice Separation Codes and a complete listing of sub-categories is provided in Appendix C.

Table 24

Interservice Separation Codes (ISC)

0	Released from active service
1	Medical disqualifications
2	Dependency or hardship
3	Death
4	Entry into officer programs
5	Retirement (other than medical)
6-8	Failure to meet minimum behavioral or performance standards
9	Other separations or discharges

The separation data obtained from DMDC was grouped according to ISC for each fiscal year 1975-1981. Table 25 illustrates the cumulative percentages of DoD prior service personnel lost from active duty in the respective ISC categories.

Table 25

DoD
Prior Service
Percent Losses by Interservice Separation Code
FY1975-FY1981

FY ISC	75	76	77	78	79	80	81
0	29.79	27.97	24.24	11.70	7.52	1.01	1.72
1	3.69	3.69	3.18	2.44	1.65	.96	.45
2	2.25	1.95	1.71	1.35	.76	.33	.06
3	.60	.48	.46	.28	.26	.20	.07
4	2.24	1.90	1.68	2.47	2.51	2.64	.65
5	.74	.57	.26	.22	.10	.09	.04
6-8	14.53	12.15	11.08	8.68	6.52	3.87	1.09
9	1.9	1.88	1.86	2.15	1.87	1.48	.64
-ETS	23.68	20.70	18.53	15.09	11.14	6.90	2.32

The two categories accounting for the largest percentages of losses are: Released from active service (0) and Failure to meet minimum behavioral or performance standards (6-8). Within category 0 the assumption is that the specific reason for discharge was an expiration of enlistment contract. Category 6-8 however, accounts for those persons who failed to meet behavioral or performance standards and were released from active duty. Because individuals were discharged with an ISC of 6, 7 or 8 does not necessarily mean that they did not complete their term of enlistment. Many marginal performers are allowed to remain in hopes that the military life-style and proper leadership will turn them around. For many immediate supervisors the special evaluation process required to discharge an individual for failure to meet minimum behavioral or performance standards is too time consuming and too much trouble to go through for the marginal performer. Therefore, the sub-standard behavior

and/or performance is noted in the individuals' regular evaluations and the person is not recommended for reenlistment. Because an enlisted person must have the recommendation of his reporting senior/commanding officer in order to reenlist it is easier not to recommend a person and not allow him to reenlist than to go through the special evaluation process.

A. ENTRY AGE

Data presented in Table 26 indicates that over the FY1975-FY1981 time period age at time of entry does not impact significantly on the attrition rate of prior service accessions.

As stated previously, within the military an accepted measure of personnel quality" is the attainment of a high school diploma. For this reason prior service attrition data was divided into two major categories: high school graduates (HSG) and non-high school graduates (NHS). The high school graduate category consists of all persons having received a diploma plus those who have some college education. The non-high school graduates include all personnel who have not attained a high school diploma plus those who have attained a General Education Diploma (G.E.D.). As noted in previous comparisons there is a significant difference in attrition between high school and non-high school graduates. This difference is demonstrated in the age

brackets of Table 26 showing aggregate attrition for entrants in fiscal years 1975 to 1981.

Table 26

DoD
Prior Service
Attrition by Age at Entry
FY1975-FY1981

FY	75	76	77	78	79	80	81
			17-20				
HSG	26.30	19.34	16.13	17.50	17.43	10.66	1.40
NHS	33.76	24.18	26.32	16.27	14.05	10.05	1.81
			21				
HSG	24.26	20.76	17.13	15.61	9.26	6.40	2.21
NHS	29.03	26.97	20.48	16.85	13.12	8.06	1.82
			22				
HSG	21.26	19.55	15.73	13.42	9.62	5.57	1.67
NHS	32.30	22.23	21.63	19.73	12.43	5.41	1.59
			23				
HSG	20.26	15.34	17.19	12.75	10.57	4.87	1.66
NHS	30.97	22.08	19.26	16.62	14.54	8.42	2.45
			24				
HSG	20.76	17.24	19.23	12.92	9.68	5.67	1.62
NHS	31.82	27.02	20.63	17.33	14.61	8.23	1.39
			25				
HSG	21.69	20.11	17.76	14.46	10.50	7.04	2.54
NHS	30.22	30.19	24.70	21.74	15.26	9.81	4.04

B. EDUCATION

Table 27 illustrates the attrition rate of prior service individuals by education level (HSG/NHS) for FY1975-FY1981. The data is grouped by the fiscal year of entry of the individual thus the declining length of service (LOS) from FY1975 to FY1981. For example, the cumulative attrition rate for those individuals separating from active duty

within 18 months of reenlistment has been declining from a high of 10.2% for FY1975 entrants to a low of 6.0% for FY1981 entrants.

Table 27

DoD
Prior Service
Cumulative Attrition
HSG versus NHS
FY1975-FY1981

	FY	75	76	77	78	79	80	81
mos								
6	HSG	2.9	3.5	3.8	2.9	2.5	2.5	1.8
	NHS	4.8	6.7	4.8	4.0	3.4	3.0	2.2
12	HSG	6.7	7.0	6.8	5.6	4.6	4.5	2.2
	NHS	10.5	12.3	9.0	7.8	6.2	5.7	2.8
18	HSG	10.2	9.9	9.2	8.0	6.8	6.0	
	NHS	15.6	16.5	12.6	10.6	9.1	8.1	
24	HSG	13.1	12.3	11.7	10.2	8.9	6.4	
	NHS	20.1	19.7	16.2	13.9	12.1	8.6	
30	HSG	15.1	14.1	13.5	11.7	10.0		
	NHS	23.1	21.7	18.2	16.3	14.0		
36	HSG	16.7	15.3	15.1	13.0	10.3		
	NHS	24.8	23.2	20.0	18.1	14.4		
42	HSG	17.7	16.3	16.0	13.5			
	NHS	26.1	24.2	20.9	18.7			
48	HSG	18.7	17.4	17.0	14.0			
	NHS	27.3	25.1	21.8	19.3			
54	HSG	19.4	17.8	17.3				
	NHS	28.2	25.7	22.3				
60	HSG	20.2	18.3	17.6				
	NHS	29.1	26.2	22.8				
66	HSG	20.9	18.7					
	NHS	30.0	26.7					
72	HSG	21.6	19.2					
	NHS	30.9	27.3					

Although individuals reenlisting fiscal years 1975 and 1976 may have served more than six years on active duty the length of service for Table 27 was limited to 72 months because the maximum term of enlistment is 72 months. This time limit also reduces data contamination by those who completed their initial term of reenlistment and subsequently reenlisted for a third term but did not complete the third enlistment contract.

Figures 4.1 and 4.2 graphically illustrate the data presented in Table 27 for high school and non-high school graduates respectively. As demonstrated in these figures the attrition rate of prior service accessions has been declining rather steadily and leveling off earlier in the last two or three years when compared to the first two years of this study.

Fig. 4.1 shows that by the end of seventy-two months, 21.6% of those high school graduates returning to active duty in FY1975 have left active duty prior to completion of their contract while 30.8% of the non-high school graduates have left active duty, illustrated in Fig. 4.2. This difference of 9.2% would appear to be significant.

Between 1 July 1975 and 30 September 1981 20.7% of the total number of prior service accessions were non-high school graduates. The data raises a question concerning the effectiveness of recruiting policies which recruits one fifth of the prior service personnel from the ranks of the

DOD
CUMULATIVE ATTRITION
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
FY1975-FY1981




Fig. 4.1

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CUMULATIVE ATTRITION
NON-HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
FY1975-FY1981




Fig. 4.2

non-high school graduate of which one third will attrite. This is opposed to the recruiting of high school graduates who comprise approximately 80% of the prior service accessions of which only one fifth will attrite.

The prior service attrition curves illustrated in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 are linear after the 48 month point due to the grouping of length of service after 48 months. The cumulative attrition rate for the 48+ months length of service was divided by the number of 6 month intervals remaining to a maximum of 72 months. The percent change by time period was then added to the previous attrition rate to obtain the percent attrition for the new length of service. Thus the attrition rate per 6 month interval is equal after the 48 month point.

The curves are very steep to the 24 month point at which time the attrition rate per time period begins to decline. This leveling is commensurate with data presented in Table 28 which indicates that the majority of attrites occur within 18 months of reenlistment.

Table 28 is a comparison of the attrition rate at the 18 month length of service to the total attrition through 30 September 1981. As the data indicates the majority of personnel attriting did so within 18 months of reenlistment. The 18 month percentages of the total attrition rate for FY1980 and FY1981 are high because not all personnel entering within those years have completed 18 months on

active duty since reenlisting. Based on an average four year enlistment the majority of attritions occur before an individual completes half of their term of enlistment.

Table 28

DoD
Prior Service Accessions
18 Month Attrition vs Total Attrition
FY1975-FY1981

	18 mos	Total	18 mos % of Total
FY75	11.38	23.68	48.06
FY76	11.19	20.70	54.06
FY77	9.87	18.53	53.26
FY78	8.57	15.09	56.79
FY79	7.24	11.14	64.99
FY80	6.50	6.90	94.20
FY81	2.32	2.32	100.00

C. BRANCH OF SERVICE

Over the years under study the Air Force prior service attrition rate has been significantly lower than the other three services. This is most likely due to the small numbers of prior service personnel the Air Force recruits, 12817 between 1 July 1975 and 30 September 1981, and the reported high standards required of these individuals. The individual service tables and respective graphs from which Table 27 was composed are presented for individual analysis in Tables 29-32.

Table 29

Army
Cumulative Attrition
HSG versus NHS
FY1975-FY1981

LOS (mos)	FY	75	76	77	78	79	80	81
6	HSG	3.6	3.9	4.4	2.7	2.4	2.1	2.0
	NHS	5.3	9.1	5.2	3.7	3.2	2.6	2.5
12	HSG	7.6	7.4	7.4	5.9	5.1	4.6	2.4
	NHS	11.2	14.0	8.6	8.1	6.9	5.6	3.2
18	HSG	11.2	10.0	9.8	8.9	7.5	6.7	
	NHS	16.2	17.4	12.3	11.5	11.2	8.5	
24	HSG	14.2	11.9	12.5	11.5	9.9	7.3	
	NHS	20.4	20.8	16.0	15.5	14.1	9.0	
30	HSG	16.3	13.8	14.8	13.1	11.0		
	NHS	23.7	23.0	18.7	18.6	16.2		
36	HSG	18.0	15.4	17.0	14.8	11.5		
	NHS	25.7	24.7	21.1	20.9	16.7		
42	HSG	18.9	16.6	18.1	15.4			
	NHS	27.0	25.8	22.5	21.5			
48	HSG	19.8	17.8	19.2	16.1			
	NHS	28.3	26.9	23.9	22.2			
54	HSG	20.6	18.3	19.4				
	NHS	29.3	27.5	24.4				
60	HSG	21.3	18.8	19.7				
	NHS	30.3	28.0	24.8				
66	HSG	22.1	19.3					
	NHS	31.3	28.5					
72	HSG	22.9	19.8					
	NHS	32.4	29.0					

ARMY
CUMULATIVE ATTRITION
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
FY1975-FY1981




Fig. 4.3

ARMY
CUMULATIVE ATTRITION
NON-HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
FY1975-FY1981




Fig. 4.4

Table 30

Navy
Cumulative Attrition
HSG versus NHS
FY1975-FY1981

LOS (mos)	FY	75	76	77	78	79	80	81
6	HSG	1.7	3.1	3.3	3.1	2.5	2.7	1.8
	NHS	2.0	4.1	4.2	4.6	4.1	3.8	2.2
12	HSG	5.6	6.9	6.7	5.3	4.3	4.6	2.1
	NHS	8.3	10.9	9.0	7.3	6.3	6.3	2.8
18	HSG	9.1	10.4	9.2	7.2	6.5	5.8	
	NHS	14.2	16.4	12.4	10.1	8.6	8.3	
24	HSG	12.1	13.4	11.4	9.3	8.3	6.0	
	NHS	19.5	19.4	16.2	12.9	11.5	9.0	
30	HSG	14.0	14.9	12.7	10.8	9.6		
	NHS	21.2	21.2	17.4	14.6	13.6		
36	HSG	15.4	15.6	13.4	11.7	9.8		
	NHS	23.0	22.5	18.5	16.2	13.7		
42	HSG	16.5	16.5	14.2	12.1			
	NHS	24.2	23.3	19.1	16.8			
48	HSG	17.7	17.4	14.9	12.4			
	NHS	25.5	24.2	19.7	17.4			
54	HSG	18.5	17.9	15.2				
	NHS	26.5	24.8	20.3				
60	HSG	19.2	18.3	15.5				
	NHS	27.4	25.4	20.9				
66	HSG	20.0	18.7					
	NHS	28.4	26.0					
72	HSG	20.7	29.1					
	NHS	29.4	26.6					

NAVY
CUMULATIVE ATTRITION
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
FY1975-FY1981




Fig. 4.5

NAVY
CUMULATIVE ATTRITION
NON-HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
FY1975-FY1981




Fig. 4.6

Table 31

Air Force
Cumulative Attrition
HSG versus NHS
FY1975-FY1981

LOS (mos)	FY	75	76	77	78	79	80	81
6	HSG	1.4	1.3	1.9	2.0	3.2	2.8	1.5
	NHS	0.0	1.7	0.0	0.0	1.3	1.9	0.0
12	HSG	3.2	4.0	4.0	3.8	4.2	4.2	1.8
	NHS	1.4	5.1	8.6	4.9	2.7	3.9	1.1
18	HSG	5.2	6.2	5.8	6.0	5.3	5.2	
	NHS	5.5	8.5	11.4	6.6	2.7	6.7	
24	HSG	7.2	8.3	7.3	7.3	6.7	5.7	
	NHS	6.9	8.5	14.3	9.8	6.7	6.7	
30	HSG	9.0	10.2	9.1	8.5	7.1		
	NHS	11.0	8.5	17.2	11.5	6.7		
36	HSG	10.7	11.8	10.5	9.4	7.3		
	NHS	13.7	10.2	20.0	11.5	6.7		
42	HSG	12.1	13.2	11.4	9.8			
	NHS	16.4	11.0	21.4	12.3			
48	HSG	13.7	14.7	12.2	10.3			
	NHS	19.2	11.9	22.9	13.1			
54	HSG	14.3	15.0	12.5				
	NHS	20.2	11.9	22.9				
60	HSG	15.0	15.4	12.9				
	NHS	21.2	11.9	22.9				
66	HSG	15.6	15.7					
	NHS	22.3	11.9					
72	HSG	16.2	16.1					
	NHS	23.3	11.9					

AIR FORCE
CUMULATIVE ATTRITION
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
FY1975-FY1981




Fig. 4.7

AIR FORCE
CUMULATIVE ATTRITION
NON-HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
FY1975-FY1981




Fig. 4.8

Table 32

Marine Corps
Cumulative Attrition
HSG versus NHS
FY1975-FY1981

LOS (mos)	FY	75	76	77	78	79	80	81
6	HSG	3.6	4.8	3.1	4.3	2.6	2.5	1.7
	NHS	5.0	6.1	5.8	3.7	1.0	1.1	1.8
12	HSG	7.7	7.7	5.3	8.1	3.8	4.4	2.2
	NHS	9.7	11.2	10.6	9.1	3.5	3.9	1.8
18	HSG	11.6	10.9	8.3	10.5	6.0	5.5	
	NHS	14.5	14.7	14.3	11.5	4.2	5.5	
24	HSG	14.0	13.1	11.3	11.3	8.7	5.6	
	NHS	20.0	18.1	17.3	14.0	7.3	5.5	
30	HSG	16.6	15.1	12.3	12.9	9.3		
	NHS	22.2	20.5	19.5	16.1	9.0		
36	HSG	17.4	16.4	13.1	14.0	9.5		
	NHS	23.3	21.6	21.0	17.3	9.7		
42	HSG	17.8	16.9	13.9	14.6			
	NHS	24.1	22.4	21.1	17.7			
48	HSG	18.2	17.3	14.7	15.1			
	NHS	25.0	23.2	21.3	18.1			
54	HSG	18.6	17.7	15.1				
	NHS	25.1	23.6	21.5				
60	HSG	19.0	18.0	15.5				
	NHS	25.3	24.0	21.6				
66	HSG	19.4	18.4					
	NHS	25.5	24.4					
72	HSG	19.7	18.7					
	NHS	25.7	24.8					

D. MENTAL CATEGORY

Tables 33 and 34 compare for each fiscal year, the cumulative attrition rate with total discharge rate by mental category of the individual. Table 33 contains high school graduates while Table 34 contains the non-high school graduates. The purpose of comparison is to determine what percentage of the annual discharges occurred prior to completion of the enlistment contract for each mental category. As demonstrated by the data a very large percentage of all discharges occur prior to completion of contract.

For high school graduates in Table 33 observation of any fiscal year indicates that the percentage of total discharges by mental category are fairly constant. The same holds true for the attrition rate. This constancy of percentages indicates that the attrition rate of prior service accessions is not significantly affected by mental category.

Table 34 presents a similar picture for non-high school graduates. For almost any fiscal year the attrition rate for non-high school graduates is approximately 50% of the total number of discharges within any given mental category.

Almost without exception the attrition rate for non-high school graduates is higher than that of high school graduates. This is true even in mental categories I and II. Comparison of Table 33 and 34 raises a question concerning the recruitment of non-high school graduates, even in mental

MARINE CORPS
CUMULATIVE ATTRITION
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
FY1975-FY1981




Fig. 4.9

MARINE CORPS
CUMULATIVE ATTRITION
NON-HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
FY1975-FY1981




Fig. 4.10

categories I and II if their probability for non-completion of enlistment is substantially greater than a lower mental category high school graduate. The largest percentages of attrition occurred in FY1980 and FY1981 for both high school and non-high school graduates in all mental categories.

Table 33

DoD, Prior Service
High School Graduate
Total Discharges vs Attrition (-ETS)
FY1975-FY1981

FY	75	76	77	78	79	80	81
Mental Category							
I&II							
Total	54.96	49.01	43.94	26.24	18.43	9.44	3.53
-ETS	21.02	19.39	18.69	14.51	11.37	6.71	2.49
-ETS % of Total	38.25	39.56	42.54	55.30	61.69	71.08	70.54
IIIA							
Total	53.94	49.73	44.61	29.25	17.45	9.79	3.26
-ETS	24.63	21.69	20.20	18.30	12.23	8.90	2.77
-ETS % of Total	45.66	43.62	45.28	62.56	70.09	90.91	84.97
IIIB							
Total	51.67	47.33	42.91	25.00	17.56	7.59	3.78
-ETS	23.98	20.71	20.00	16.25	11.40	6.92	2.98
-ETS % of Total	46.41	43.76	46.61	65.00	64.92	91.17	78.84
IV							
Total	52.22	60.61	42.55	25.98	17.53	8.73	3.04
-ETS	23.44	26.90	18.92	16.74	11.51	8.35	2.40
-ETS % of Total	44.89	44.38	44.47	64.43	65.66	95.65	78.95
UNK							
Total	54.81	50.28	42.23	30.00	24.17	14.17	6.61
-ETS	19.43	16.80	13.60	10.42	1.91	4.53	1.51
-ETS % of Total	35.45	33.41	32.20	34.73	.01	31.97	22.84

Table 34

DoD, Prior Service
Non-High School Graduates
Total Discharges vs Attrition (-ETS)
FY1975-FY1981

FY	75	76	77	78	79	80	81
Mental Category							
I&II							
Total	60.73	53.78	46.69	32.15	23.23	9.45	5.34
-ETS	30.46	27.76	23.18	19.02	15.58	9.13	4.27
-ETS % of Total	50.16	51.62	49.65	59.16	67.07	96.61	79.96
IIIA							
Total	59.48	57.03	49.49	37.65	25.83	11.99	4.99
-ETS	33.31	34.18	25.26	21.92	16.84	11.20	4.54
-ETS % of Total	56.00	59.93	51.04	58.22	65.20	93.41	90.98
IIIB							
Total	60.16	52.06	52.23	37.23	28.04	11.97	4.84
-ETS	33.23	25.47	25.27	23.12	19.32	11.71	3.95
-ETS % of Total	55.24	48.92	48.38	62.10	68.90	97.83	81.61
IV							
Total	58.58	56.37	51.67	42.29	28.22	10.12	2.26
-ETS	30.48	27.28	27.63	23.15	19.56	9.55	1.13
-ETS % of Total	52.03	48.39	53.47	54.74	69.31	94.37	50.00
UNK							
Total	63.88	55.80	49.27	33.71	24.16	7.00	4.80
-ETS	25.98	24.45	18.00	14.83	8.40	5.09	1.27
-ETS % of Total	40.67	43.82	36.53	43.99	34.77	72.71	26.46

E. SUMMARY

Age at the time of reenlistment has little bearing on the attrition rate of prior service accessions.

Within any fiscal year the largest percentage of attrities for all services are non-high school graduates. Even in the upper two mental groups non-high school graduates account for the largest percentage of attrites.

Over the past two or three fiscal years the attrition rate of prior service accessions has been declining suggesting that there are external factors which affect the attrition rate of prior service accessants.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

A. CONCLUSIONS

With a declining youth population from which to recruit personnel the armed forces must find new sources of qualified personnel to man its units. As demonstrated in this thesis there is a large pool of veterans available for reenlistment. They present a good source of personnel in that they have already been indoctrinated toward the military life-style, are experienced with the equipment and require little or no additional training thus reducing the costs of placing an individual in an operational billet.

Veterans have always been a part of recruiting but there has never been a concentrated emphasis on their recruitment. Even with the technically advanced hardware in today's modern military where there is a growing need for experienced personnel the services are not actively seeking to recruit veterans. For example, the Navy in FY1981 limited prior service accessions to a maximum of 1,000 per month and this quota was normally filled in the first week of each month.

Between 1 July 1975 and 30 September 1981 the armed forces of the United States have discharged some 3.5 million male veterans who had at least two years on active duty. Of this number approximately 2,052,000 were eligible for reenlistment at the time of their discharge.

This thesis focused on the specific age bracket of 19 to 35 year-olds as a pool of personnel available for reenlistment. This age bracket accounted for 46.7% of the total available pool, some 1.6 million individuals. Of the veterans discharged in this age bracket 68.3% of them were eligible for reenlistment.

From 1 July 1975 through 30 September 1981 the military has accessed approximately 106,000 veterans with two or more years on active duty. This is only 3% of the available pool and only 6.5% of the 19 to 35 year-old pool. The numbers and percentages presented in this study indicate that there is and has been a gross under utilization of this pool of experienced personnel.

The military generally has measured recruit quality by the proxy measures of mental category and education level. Data in this study indicated that, after two years of service, mental category does not significantly affect an individuals eligibility to reenlist upon initial separation nor the attrition rate of those who do reenlist.

The one "quality" measurement which consistently partitions personnel is the possession of a high school diploma. Within this study the high school graduate category consisted of all personnel possessing a high school diploma and/or some college. The non-high school category consisted of all personnel who did not possess a high school diploma plus those who had attained a General Education Diploma

(G.E.D.). As the data indicated in Chapter II, 52.5% of non-high school graduates were reenlistment ineligible. Similar percentages hold for each mental category. The majority, 58.51% of separating 19 year-olds are ineligible for reenlistment. Between 70.0% and 90.5% of the non-rated personnel separating are also ineligible for reenlistment.

The largest percentages of initial separations occur in paygrades E-4 and E-5 and the majority of these personnel are eligible for reenlistment. Data on the length of service of the available pool indicates that the majority 61.0%, of separations occur prior to, or at the six year point. The paygrades E-4 and E-5 are commensurate with the length of service requirements for advancement which can be achieved during a four to six year enlistment.

Data presented in Chapter III on the actual prior service accessions indicates that the majority, 52.8% of returning veterans are between the ages of 22 and 25. The distribution of prior service accessions by mental category is fairly constant for each of the fiscal years 1975 to 1981. The majority of prior service accessions initially separated in paygrade E-4 and returned in paygrades E-3 and E-4. The majority, 54.7%, of veterans returning to active duty without a loss in paygrade did so within one year of initial separation. After the 18 month point of broken service the amount of paygrade reduction increases with increased length of broken service.

The attrition rate of prior service accessions has little relationship to the age at the time of reenlistment as indicated by the data presented in Chapter IV.

Within any fiscal year the largest percentage of attrites for all services are non-high school graduates. This is true even in the upper mental categories, I and II.

The majority, 50.9%, of prior service accessions reenlist for four years. Over the time period under consideration between 48.1% and 65.0% of those persons who have attrited did so within 18 months of reenlisting thus indicating that they are not completing half of their reenlistment contract.

With such a large pool of experienced personnel available more prior service people should be accessed. They possess the skills, know-how, maturity and corporate knowledge needed by today's modern military.

B. FURTHER RESEARCH

The data presented tends to support reevaluation of prior service recruiting policies. The data questions the reenlistment of non-high school graduates, over half of which will not complete their new enlistment contract.

Further research needs to be conducted in the area of skill degradation to determine if the paygrade reductions for returning veterans based on their length of broken service are inappropriate.

This thesis did not attempt any in-depth statistical analysis thus leaving many areas open for further analysis.

It is felt that there are external factors which affect the decision of veterans to return to active duty and the performance of marginal personnel. Most notably is the civilian unemployment rate and the relative wage structure of civilian occupations.

Although the active recruitment of these experienced personnel appears to be highly desirable if the majority of them return within one year of separation it would seem that improvements in the retention programs may prevent them from ever leaving the service. This area may lend itself well to a cost-benefit analysis of programs for increasing the recruitment of prior service personnel compared with programs for increasing retention.

Further analysis should be conducted in the area of performance comparison between the prior service accession and his non-prior service counterpart who never left active duty. A comparison in performance as reported by regular evaluations and by promotion achievement would seem appropriate. Advancement in paygrade could be compared in terms of how long did it take the respective individuals to achieve the next higher paygrade. Does the prior service accessant achieve rank faster than, slower than or at the same rate as his non-prior service counterpart?

APPENDIX A

OPEN SKILLS (NEC'S)

0412	2353	4954	8732---(NOTE 12)
0416	2359	5311---(NOTE 7)	8752---(NOTE 12)
0421	2612	532X---(NOTE 7)	8753---(NOTE 12)
0422	3303	533X---(NOTE 7)	9201
0426	3304	5341---(NOTE 7)	9203
0428	3305	5342---(NOTE 7)	9212
0447	3313	5343---(NOTE 7)	9215
07XX	3314	5346---(NOTE 7)	9216
0876	3315	7225	9230
0877	3316	8251	9232
0878	3317	8261	9233
0891	332X	8263	9235
0892	333X	8264	9236
0987	334X	8265	9240
234X	4245	8283	9243
0991	4204	8402---(NOTE 12)	
0993	4291	8406---(NOTE 12)	
1125	4301	8407---(NOTE 12)	
1127	4314	8409---(NOTE 12)	
1130	4381	8416---(NOTE 12)	
1138	4382	8425---(NOTE 12)	
1149	4398	8432---(NOTE 12)	
1181	4515	8433---(NOTE 12)	
119X	4518	8444---(NOTE 12)	
1427	4519	8445---(NOTE 12)	
1442	4521	8446---(NOTE 12)	
1443	4626	8452---(NOTE 12)	
1451	4631	8477---(NOTE 12)	
1453	4632	8478---(NOTE 12)	
1454	4703	8482---(NOTE 12)	
1461	4711	8483---(NOTE 12)	
147X	4715	8485---(NOTE 12)	
148X	4724	8486---(NOTE 12)	
1502	4747	8492---(NOTE 12)	
1503	4771	8493---(NOTE 12)	
1572	4775	8495---(NOTE 12)	
1573	4776	8496---(NOTE 12)	
1588	4933	8501---(NOTE 12)	
1637	4934	8503---(NOTE 12)	
1638	4935	8505---(NOTE 12)	
1821	4936	8506---(NOTE 12)	
2319	4937	8714---(NOTE 12)	
2332	4938		
2333	4939		
2335			

PERSONNEL WITH SS/SU DESIGNATOR IN THE FOLLOWING RATINGS:
DS ET FTG HM MS PN SK
RM STS TM YN IC MM QM

RATING/RATE LISTS (MALE)
CREQ CATEGORIES (RATES)

<u>RATING</u>	<u>CREO GROUP</u>	<u>E-4</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-7</u>	<u>E-8</u>	<u>E-9</u>	<u>NOTES</u>
AB	A	-	-	-	-	A	A	
AC	A	A	A	B	A	A	B	(10)
AQ	A	A	A	B	B	D	-	
AT	A	A	A	C	B	C	-	
AV	A	-	-	-	-	-	-	
AW	A	A	A	C	C	B	B	
AX	A	A	A	A	B	B	-	
BT	A	A	A	B	B	A	A	
CTT	A	A	A	B	B	C	B	(8)(9)
DS	A	A	B	A	A	B	A	
EM	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	(3)
ET	A	A	A	B	B	C	A	(3)
EW	A	A	B	A	A	C	A	(8)(9)
FT	A	-	-	-	-	B	A	(3)
FTG	A	A	A	A	A	-	-	(3)
FTM	A	A	A	A	A	-	-	(3)
GMG	A	A	A	C	A	-	-	(1)
GMM	A	A	B	A	A	-	-	
GMT	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	
GS	A	-	-	-	-	A	A	(8)
GSE	A	A	B	B	A	-	-	(8)(9)
GSM	A	A	A	A	B	-	-	(8)(9)
HT	A	B	A	A	B	B	B	
IC	A	A	A	A	A	D	-	(3)
IM	A	A	A	A	A	B	-	
IS	A	A	B	A	B	C	B	(8)(9)
MM	A	A	A	A	B	C	A	(3)
MR	A	B	A	B	B	A	A	
OM	A	A	A	B	C	A	-	
OS	A	B	A	A	B	A	A	
QM	A	B	B	A	B	A	A	
STG	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	
ABE	B	B	B	A	A	-	-	
ABH	B	B	A	D	B	-	-	
AE	B	C	A	C	B	A	-	
AF	B	-	-	-	-	-	B	
AG	B	B	A	B	B	B	B	(10)
AK	B	A	B	C	B	A	A	

RATING/RATE LISTS (MALE)
CREO CATEGORIES (RATES)

<u>RATING</u>	<u>CREO GROUP</u>	<u>E-4</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-7</u>	<u>E-8</u>	<u>E-9</u>	<u>NOTES</u>
AME	B	C	A	C	D	-	-	(3)(8)(9)
AO	B	C	A	B	C	B	C	(3)
ASE	B	B	B	-	-	-	-	
BU	B	A	A	B	C	C	-	(8)(9)(11)
CTI	B	A	A	B	C	B	B	(3)(8)(9)(11)
CTM	B	A	B	C	B	C	C	(3)(8)(9)
CTR	B	A	B	C	C	C	B	(8)(9)
DP	B	B	C	C	B	A	A	(10)
DK	B	A	A	D	B	B	B	
EN	B	A	A	B	C	D	C	(3)
FTB	B	B	B	B	C	-	-	(1)(3)(8)(9)
GM	B	-	-	-	-	B	C	
LI	B	B	C	C	A	C	B	
LN	B	-	A	C	B	B	B	
MA	B	-	-	B	B	B	A	(3)
ML	B	B	A	D	B	B	C	
MN	B	A	C	C	B	C	A	(8)(9)
MU	B	A	B	C	C	C	B	(9)
NC	B	-	-	A	C	B	C	
OT	B	B	A	C	B	A	A	
PM	B	B	A	D	B	-	-	
RM	B	A	A	C	C	C	A	(3)
RP	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	(1)(8)(9)
SM	B	B	B	A	B	D	A	
ST	B	-	-	-	-	-	B	
STS	B	A	C	A	B	A	-	(1)(3)
TD	B	A	B	C	B	A	B	(10)
TM	B	A	B	C	C	A	A	(3)
ABF	C	C	B	C	B	-	-	
AD	C	C	B	C	C	C	-	(3)
AMH	C	D	A	C	C	-	-	(3)
AMS	C	D	B	C	C	-	-	(3)
AS	C	-	-	C	B	A	B	
ASM	C	D	C	-	-	-	-	
AZ	C	A	C	B	B	A	A	
BM	C	B	B	C	C	C	C	
CE	C	B	A	C	C	D	-	(8)(9)(11)

RATING/RATE LISTS (MALE)
CREO CATEGORIES (RATES)

<u>RATING</u>	<u>CREO GROUP</u>	<u>E-4</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-7</u>	<u>E-8</u>	<u>E-9</u>	<u>NOTES</u>
CM	C	D	B	C	C	C	-	(8)(9)(11)
CTA	C	A	C	C	C	B	B	(8)(9)
CTO	C	C	B	C	C	C	C	(8)(9)
CU	C	-	-	-	-	-	C	(2)
DM	C	B	B	D	D	B	E	(1)
DT	C	D	C	C	B	C	B	(8)(9)
EA	C	B	A	D	B	B	-	(8)(9)(11)
EO	C	C	C	D	C	C	-	(8)(9)(11)
EQ	C	-	-	-	-	-	C	(2)
HM	C	D	C	C	C	D	C	(3)(8)(9)
JO	C	B	B	C	B	D	B	(8)(9)
MT	C	C	C	C	C	-	-	(1)(3)(8)(9)
MS	C	A	C	D	D	B	C	(3)
PC	C	B	B	C	B	C	B	
PH	C	D	B	D	D	D	B	(10)
PI	C	-	-	-	-	-	C	
PN	C	C	C	B	D	C	C	(3)
PR	C	C	B	C	D	A	B	(8)(9)
SH	C	B	B	D	C	C	D	
SK	C	A	B	C	C	B	C	(3)
SW	C	C	B	D	C	C	-	(8)(9)(11)
UT	C	C	B	D	B	B	B	(8)(9)(11)
YN	C	B	B	C	C	D	C	(3)
AM	D	-	-	-	-	D	-	(3)

Since female goals do not exist for entry by women the following ratings are not included above:

AV	FTB	MM
AW	FTM	MT
BT	GMM	ST
EW	GS	STG
FT	GSE	STS
	GSM	

NOTES

- (1) NO DPEP INPUTS ALLOWED.
- (2) NO PRIOR SERVICE INPUTS ALLOWED.
- (3) SEE OPEN SKILLS LIST FOR CERTAIN QUALIFICATION/NECS IN THIS RATING WHICH ARE NOT GOVERNED BY CREO GROUP OF RATING.
- (4) CNMPC (NMPC-21) APPROVAL TO EFFECT REENLISTMENT OR MAKE OPERATIVE AN EXTENSION SUBSEQUENT TO THE FIRST REENLISTMENT FOR ALL PERSONNEL WITH LESS THAN TEN YEAR DAY-FOR-DAY ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE.
- (5) MUST HAVE SERVED IN THE APPLICABLE 82XX BILLET FOR 3 YEARS DURING THE LAST ENLISTMENT OR ONE YEAR WITHIN THE LAST 4 YEARS, THE TOTAL ELAPSED TIME OUT OF THE APPLICABLE 82XX BILLET NOT TO EXCEED 3 YEARS (NOT APPLICABLE TO FEMALE LIST)
- (6) MUST HOLD CURRENT CERTIFICATION OF FIRST CLASS SWIM QUALIFICATION PRIOR TO SUBMITTING UNDER THIS NEC (NOT APPLICABLE TO FEMALE LIST).
- (7) RATING CONVERSION FOR PERSONNEL IN THE SEAL/UDT, EOD OR DIVER CLOSED LOOP SNEC COMMUNITY IS PREDICATED UPON THE MANNING LEVEL OF EACH SOURCE RATING WITHIN THAT CLOSED LOOP SNEC (NOT APPLICABLE TO FEMALE LIST).
- (8) "A" SCHOOL REQUIRED FOR LATERAL CONVERSION.
- (9) RATING ENTRY BY NON DESIGNATED PERSONNEL REQUIRES "A" SCHOOL
- (10) PERSONNEL APPLYING FOR SCORE SHOULD SUBMIT ALTERNATE RATING CHOICES.
- (11) RECALL OF USNR/USNR-R TO ACTIVE DUTY REQUIRES CNMPC APPROVAL REGARDLESS OF CREO CATEGORY.
- (12) DNMP (NMPC-407) APPROVAL REQUIRED TO EFFECT REENLISTMENT OF PERSONNEL UNDER BROKEN SERVICE CONDITIONS OF ENLISTMENT OR PERSONNEL POSSESSING CIVILIAN ACQUIRED TRAINING/WORK EXPERIENCE (DPEP).

APPENDIX B

Table 35

Available Pool
Separation Paygrade (SEPPG) by Service
FY1975-FY1981

	ARMY			
SEPPG	Eligible	Ineligible	Unknown	Total
E-1	5.76	88.27	5.97	41501
E-2	19.15	71.40	9.45	44814
E-3	35.75	58.66	5.60	107821
E-4	62.74	32.84	4.42	567957
E-5	67.47	26.59	5.94	316247
E-6	66.65	25.54	7.71	163385
E-7	52.95	40.52	6.53	107637
E-8	42.34	50.64	7.03	21850
E-9	36.76	55.69	7.55	12502
UNK	64.63	14.63	20.73	82

	NAVY			
SEPPG				
E-1	3.55	88.75	7.71	27362
E-2	10.17	81.63	8.19	44088
E-3	26.40	66.91	6.69	104051
E-4	73.89	22.52	3.59	209330
E-5	76.01	20.76	3.23	184064
E-6	61.33	37.08	1.59	119812
E-7	34.41	64.03	1.56	60154
E-8	27.56	70.92	1.52	17894
E-9	21.96	76.35	1.69	8602

	AIR FORCE			
SEPPG				
E-1	.64	98.46	.90	6747
E-2	.55	98.80	.65	8676
E-3	1.87	97.74	.39	39130
E-4	71.39	25.76	1.85	376089
E-5	74.42	21.03	4.55	255475
E-6	57.95	33.79	8.27	151903
E-7	45.05	46.70	8.25	115757
E-8	44.73	47.27	8.00	34650
E-9	38.72	53.64	7.65	18860

	MARINE CORPS			
SEPPG				
E-1	3.64	93.36	3.01	29243
E-2	19.58	85.46	3.96	25202
E-3	35.01	61.74	3.25	58728

Table 35
(Continued)

E-4	65.34	33.95	.71	95748
E-5	74.47	24.90	.63	83469
E-6	70.22	29.36	.43	34105
E-7	66.66	33.07	.26	20233
E-8	45.67	54.19	.14	9308
E-9	43.84	55.64	.52	4044

SEPARATION PAYGRADE BY SERVICE

FY1975-FY1981




Fig. B1.1

SEPARATION PAYGRADE BY SERVICE

FY1975-FY1981




Fig. B1.2

APPENDIX C

INTERSERVICE SEPARATION CODES PART I: ENLISTED

- 00 Transaction (Immediate Reenlistment, Enlistment Extension, Dropped from Rolls, Record Correction) or Unknown
- 0 RELEASE FROM ACTIVE SERVICE
 - 01 Expiration of Term of Service
FBK, FBL, JBK, KBK, KEA, KEC, LBK, MBK, MBN, MFA, MEC
 - 02 Early Release - Insufficient Retainability
JBM, JED, KBM, LBM, LED, MBM
Air Force: J10
 - 03 Early Release - To Attend School
KCE, KCF, MCE, MCF
 - 04 Early Release - Police Duty
KCG, MCG
 - 05 Early Release - In the National Interest
JDJ, KCK, KDJ, MCK, MDJ
 - 06 Early Release - Seasonal Employment
KCJ, MCJ
 - 07 Early Release - To Teach
KCH, MCH
 - 08 Early Release - Other (Including RIF)
JCC, JDM, JDR, KCC, KDM, KDR, KEB, LCC, LDM, LGJ, MCC, MDM, MDR, MEB, MGJ, XDM
Air Force: 711, 712, 715, 716, 717, 781, 782
- 1 MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATIONS
 - 10 Conditions Existing Prior to Service
GFN, JFM, JFN, KFN
 - 11 Disability - Severance Pay
JFL
 - 12 Permanent Disability - Retired
RFJ, SFK, VFJ
 - 13 Temporary Disability - Retired
RFK, SFK, VFK, WFK

- 14 Disability - Non EPTS - No Severence Pay
JFR, LFR
- 15 Disability - Title 10 Retirement
- 16 Unqualified for Active Duty - Other
GFT, GFV, HFT, HFV, JFT, JFU, JFV, KFT, KFV, LFT,
MFT, XFT
- 2 DEPENDENCY OR HARDSHIP
 - 22 Dependency or Hardship
KDB, KDH, MDB, MDH, XDH
- 3 DEATH
 - 30 Battle Casualty
Army: 944
Navy: 892
Marine Corps: H24, 824
 - 32 Non-Battle - Other
Army: 946
Navy: 880-891, 893-899
Marine Corps: H21-H23, H25-H59, 821-823, 825-859,
H3I, H4G, H5I, 82B, 82E, 82I, 83B, 83C, 83I, 84B,
85B, 85D, 85I
 - 33 Death - Cause Not Specified
Air Force: 474
- 4 ENTRY INTO OFFICER PROGRAMS
 - 40 Officer Commissioning Program
KGL, KGM, KGN, KGS, KGX, MGX
 - 41 Warrant Officer Program
KGT, KGW
 - 42 Service Academy
KGU, MGU, PGU
Army: 948, 949
- 5 RETIREMENT (OTHER THAN MEDICAL)
 - 50 20-30 Years of Service
JBD, KBD, NBD, RBD, SBD
 - 51 Over 30 Years of Service
RBC

52 Other Categories
RBB, VBK, XBK, XDS

6 FAILURE TO MEET MINIMUM BEHAVIORAL OF PERFORMANCE CRITERIA

60 Character or Behavior Disorder
GMB, GMK, HMB, JMB, JMK, KMB

61 Motivational Problem (Apathy)
GMJ, HMJ, JMJ, LMJ

62 Enuresis
GMC, HMC, JMC

63 Inaptitude
GMD, HMD, JMD

64 Alcoholism
GMG, HMG, JMG

65 Discreditable Incidents - Civilian or Military
GKA, GLB, HKA, HLB, JKA, JLB

66 Shirking
GKJ, GLJ, HKJ, JLJ, JKJ, JIJ

67 Drugs
BLF, GKK, GLF, GMM, GPB, HKK, HLF, HMM, JKK, JLF, JMM,
JPB

68 Financial Irresponsibility
GKE, GLG, GMH, HKE, HLG, HMH, JKE, JLG, JMH, KLG

69 Lack of Dependent Support
GKH, GLH, HKH, HLH, JKH, JIH

70 Unsanitary Habits
GLK, GMP, HLK, HMP, JKV, JIK, JIP

71 Civil Court Conviction
GKB, HKB, JKB

72 Security
BDK, GDK, HDK, JIK, LDK

73 Court Martial
GLB, HJB, JJB, JIC, JID

74 Fraudulent Entry
GKG, HKG, JKG, YKG

- 75 AWOL, Desertion
GKD, GKF, HKD, HKF, JKD
Army, Navy, Air Force, JKF
- 76 Homosexuality
BLC, BML, DLC, GKC, GLC, GML, GRA, GRB, GRC, HKC, HLC,
HML, HRA, HRB, HRC, JKC, JLC, JML
- 77 Sexual Perversion
GKLM GLL, GMF, HKLM HLL, HMF, JKL, JLL, JMF
- 78 Good of the Service
BFS, DFS, JFS, KFS, KNL
- 79 Juvenile Offender
JFE
- 80 Misconduct (Reason Unknown)
BNC, GNC, HNC, JFP, JHM, JNC
- 81 Unfitness (Reason Unknown)
BLM, JNG, KLM
- 82 Unsuitability (Reason Unknown)
BHJ, BHK, BMN, CBL, GHJ, GHK, GMN, HHJ, HMN, JHK
Army, Marine Corps, Air Force: JHJ
Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force: KMN
- 84 Basic Training Attrition
- 85 Failure to Meet Minimum Qualifications for Retention
JGF, JHE, KGF
Army, Navy, Marine Corps: JGZ
Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force: LEM, LET, LGH
Navy, Marine Corps: JEM, JET, JGH
- 86 Expeditious Discharge
Army: JGH, LGH, KMN
Navy: JHJ
Marine Corps: JFG (8)
Air Force: JEM, JGH
- 87 Trainee Discharge
Army: JEM, JET, JNF, LEM, LET, LNF
Marine Corps: JFG (9)
Air Force: JET, JGZ
- 9 OTHER SEPARATIONS OR DISCHARGES
- 90 Secretarial Authority
JFF, KFF, LFF, MFF
Air Force: 713

- 91 Erroneous Enlistment or Induction
JFC, KFC, LFC, MFC, YFC
- 92 Sole Surviving Son
KCO, MCQ
- 93 Marriage
KDC, MDC
- 94 Pregnancy
FDF, HDF, JDF, KDF, MDF
- 95 Minority
JFB, KFB, YFB
- 96 Conscientious Objector
FCM, JCM, KCM
- 97 Parenthood
FDG, JDG, KDG, LDG, MDG
- 98 Breach of Contract
JDP, KDP, KDQ, KDS, LDP, MDP, MDS, XDP
- 99 Other
FBC, FND, GHF, JBB, JBC, JBH, JCP, JDN, JHD, JHF, JND,
KBH, KBJ, KCP, KDN, KFG, KHD, KHF, KND, KNF, LBH, LDN,
LFG, LND, MDN, MFG, MHD, MND, MNF, VNF, XND, YCP, YDN,
YND
Army, Navy, Air Force: JFG
Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force: JNF, LNF
Marine Corps: JFG (1-7)
Air Force: J11

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